Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/223787
Authors: 
Stefan, Matthias
Huber, Jürgen
Kirchler, Michael
Sutter, Matthias
Walzl, Markus
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13345
Abstract: 
Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.
Subjects: 
multi-tasking decision problem
rank incentives
framed field experiment
finance professionals
JEL: 
C93
D02
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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