Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/223686
Authors: 
Marinescu, Ioana E.
Ouss, Ivan
Pape, Louis-Daniel
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13244
Abstract: 
How does employer market power affect workers? We compute the concentration of new hires by occupation and commuting zone in France using linked employer-employee data. Using instrumental variables with worker and firm fixed effects, we find that a 10% increase in labor market concentration decreases hires by 12.4% and the wages of new hires by nearly 0.9%, as hypothesized by monopsony theory. Based on a simple merger simulation, we find that a merger between the top two employers in the retail industry would be most damaging, with about 24 million euros in annual lost wages for new hires, and an 8000 decrease in annual hires.
Subjects: 
labor market concentration
wages
hires
merger simulation
JEL: 
J31
J32
J42
L13
J51
L40
L41
L44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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