Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221628
Authors: 
Solan, Eilon
Vohra, Rakesh V.
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 1272
Abstract: 
An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage. We prove that every n-player absorbing game admits a correlated equilibrium. In other words, for every epsilon>0 there exits a probability distribution p (epsilon subscript) over the space of pure strategy profiles such that if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p (epsilon subscript) and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than epsilon in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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