Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221615
Authors: 
Bergemann, Dirk
Valimaki, Juuso
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1259
Abstract: 
We consider a general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria and characterize theequilibrium set for a refinement of the Markov perfect equilibria. Particular attention is given to the existence of a marginal contribution equilibrium where each principal receives her contribution to the coalition of agent and remaining principals. The structure of the intertemporal payoffs is analyzed in terms of the flow marginal contribution. As a by-product, new results for the static common agency game are obtained. The general characterization results are then applied to two dynamic bidding games for a common agent: (i ) multi-task allocation and (ii ) job matching under uncertainty.
Subjects: 
Common agency
dynamic bidding
marginal contribution
markov perfect equilibrium
coalition-proof equilibrium
job matching
multi-task allocation
JEL: 
D81
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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