Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221493
Authors: 
Jones, Michael A.
Year of Publication: 
1995
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1137
Abstract: 
It is known that the only subgame perfect equilibrium for finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemna games consists of "defecting" in every round. Finitely repeated games are only representative of a class of indefinitely repeated games where the sole subgame perfect equilibrium is noncooperative. This broader class of repeated games with "quasifinite" continuation probabilities is defined. A matrix inequality is recalled that when solved by a cooperation vector, induces a subgame perfect equilibrium. A condition for continuation probabilities indicates when this matrix inequality can be satisfied at equality by a cooperation vector. The associated strategy is a cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.