Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221488 
Year of Publication: 
1995
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1132
Publisher: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Abstract: 
As shown, the source of Sen's and Arrow's impossibility theorems is that Sen's Liberal condition and Arrow's IIA counter the critical assumption that voters' have transitive preferences. As this allows transitive and certain cyclic preferences to become indistinguishable, the Pareto condition forces cycles. Once the common cause of these perplexing conclusions is understood, resolutions are immediate.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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