Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221469 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1994
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1113
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
A q-rule is where, for n-voters, a winning coalition consists of q or more voters. An important question is to determine when, generically, core points exist; that is, when the core exists in other than highly contrived settings. As known, the answer depends upon the dimension of issue space. McKelvey and Schofield found bounds on these dimensions, but Banks found a subtle, but critical error in their proofs. The sharp dimensional values along with results about the structure of the core are derived.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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