Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221435
Authors: 
Rogerson, William P.
Year of Publication: 
1993
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1078
Abstract: 
This paper descrives some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurment policy analysis. It descrives the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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