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Saari, Donald G.
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 969
This is the first of three papers introducing a theory for positional voting methods that determines all possible election rankings and relationships that ever could occur with a profile over all possible subsets of candidates for any specified choices of positional voting methods. As such, these results extend to all positional voting systems what was previously possible only for the Borda Count and the plurality voting systems. In this first part certain mathematical symmetries based on neutrality are used 1) to generalize the basic properties that cause the desired features of the Borda Count and 2) to describe classes of positional voting methods with new types of election relationships among the election outcomes. Some of these relationships generalize the well-known results about the positioning of a Condorcet winner/loser within a Borda ranking, but now it is possible for the Condorcet loser, rather than the winner, to have the advantage to win certain positional elections. Included among the results are axiomatic characterizations of many positional voting methods.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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