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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1990
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 966
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We study social choice correspondences which can be implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms. (An undominated Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy. A mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by an undominated strategy). We provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation. Our conditions are satisfied in virtually all "economic" settings, and are also satisfied by many interesting correspondences identified in the social choice literature. For economic settings, we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism in which the undominated Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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