Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Iorio, Karl
Manuelli, Alejandro M.
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 915
This paper shows the existence of sequential and weak-best-response equilibria for cheap-talk extensions of signaling games for a class of signaling games called communication-impervious. An example shows there are well-behaved infinite signaling games with no sequential equilibria. The assumption that talk is cheap seems reasonable in many economic contexts and yields a very straightforward solution to the existence problem in infinite signaling games. The cheap-talk assumption opens the possibility of extending the methods of this paper to prove the existence of equilibrium in more-general extensive-form games with infinite action and information sets.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.