Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Vigenina, Denitsa
Kritikos, Alexander S.
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
The Postgraduate Research Programme working paper series / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Graduiertenkolleg "Kapitalmärkte und Finanzwirtschaft im erweiterten Europa" 2005,10
We analyze the incentive mechanism of individual micro-lending contracts and we compare its key factors with those of joint-liability loan contracts. Using our data set, we firstly show that in the individual contract there are three elements, the demand for non-conventional collateral, a screening procedure which combines new with traditional elements, and dynamic incentives in combination with the termination threat in case of default, which ensure high repayment rates of up to 100%. We further show that the joint-liability approach may lead to similar repayment rates, however based on a different incentive system. We reveal that the target group which can be efficiently served by either one of the two mechanisms is different.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
322.77 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.