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Zou, Zhengxing
van den Brink, Rene
Chun, Youngsub
Funaki, Yukihiko
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2019-072/II
We present axiomatic characterizations of the proportional division value for TU-games, a value that distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to the stand-alone worths of its members. First, a new proportionality principle, called balanced treatment, is introduced by strengthening Shapley's symmetry axiom, which states that if two players make the same contribution to any nonempty coalition, then they receive the amounts in proportion to their stand-alone worths.We characterize the family of values satisfying efficiency, weak linearty, and balanced treatment. We also show that this family is incompatible with the dummy player property. However, we show that the proportional division value is the unique value in this family that satisfies the dummifying player property. Second, we propose three appropriate monotonicity axioms by considering two games in which the stand-alone worths of all players are equal or in the same proportion to each other, and obtain three axiomatizations of the proportional division value without both weak linearity and the dummifying player property. Third, from the perspective of a variable player set, we show that the proportional division value is the only one that satisfies proportional standardness and projection consistency. Finally, we provide characterizations of proportional standardness.
Cooperative game
proportional division value
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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