Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219283 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-18
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the emergence of cooperation in structured populations with any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the evolutionary graph. In a computational approach using structure coefficients defined for configurations describing such arrangements of any number of mutants, we provide results for weak selection to favor cooperation over defection on any regular graph with N ≤ 14 vertices. Furthermore, the properties of graphs that particularly promote cooperation are analyzed. It is shown that the number of graph cycles of a certain length is a good predictor for the values of the structure coefficient, and thus a tendency to favor cooperation. Another property of particularly cooperation-promoting regular graphs with a low degree is that they are structured to have blocks with clusters of mutants that are connected by cut vertices and/or hinge vertices.
Schlagwörter: 
evolutionary game theory
fixation properties
graph cycles
graph-theoretical properties
regular graphs
structure coefficients
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.