Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217133 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1453-1487
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap-talk refinement, neologism-proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is neologism-proof is played more often; senders deviate from an equilibrium in a way that can be predicted by the credibility of the neologism; and receivers' behavior indicates that they understand senders' deviating incentives. Our second set of treatments evaluates neologism-proofness from an evolutionary perspective in the absence of a common language. We find that the proportion of observations in which the meaning of a neologism evolves to disrupt a prevailing fully revealing equilibrium is lower when the equilibrium is neologism-proof. Our findings shed light on the capabilities and limitations of the refinement concept in predicting laboratory behavior under different language environments.
Subjects: 
Neologism-proofness
cheap talk
equilibrium refinement
evolution of meanings
laboratory experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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