Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215213 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12817
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects' earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.
Subjects: 
delegation
threshold public goods
laboratory experiment
fundraising
JEL: 
C91
C92
H40
H41
L31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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