Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214357 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2006-11
Publisher: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Abstract: 
Why so many people pay their taxes, although fines and audit probability are low, has become a central question in the tax compliance literature. A homo economicus, with a more refined motivation structure, helps us to shed light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and tax morale.
Subjects: 
tax morale
tax compliance
tax evasion
pro-social behavior
institutions
JEL: 
H26
H73
D64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.