Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214354 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2006-08
Publisher: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Abstract: 
It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the social interactions between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an empirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be ?bloodier? in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.
Subjects: 
Terrorism
media
common-interest-game
coordination
conflict
JEL: 
C72
D74
H52
H77
J22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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