Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21381 
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dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en
dc.contributor.authorGang, Ira N.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:21:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:21:53Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21381-
dc.description.abstractGovernments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government?s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as aresult of fiscal federalism.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x547en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelH73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen
dc.subject.keywordeconomic models of political processesen
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen
dc.subject.keywordrentseekingen
dc.subject.keywordintergovernmental relationsen
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen
dc.subject.stwVereinigte Staatenen
dc.titleGovernment and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn845699717en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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