Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21381
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dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGang, Ira N.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:21:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:21:53Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21381-
dc.description.abstractGovernments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government?s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as aresult of fiscal federalism.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x547en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelH73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordeconomic models of political processesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrentseekingen_US
dc.subject.keywordintergovernmental relationsen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwVereinigte Staatenen_US
dc.titleGovernment and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Makingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn845699717en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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