Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21381 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 547
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government?s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of fiscal federalism.
Schlagwörter: 
fiscal federalism
economic models of political processes
contests
rentseeking
intergovernmental relations
JEL: 
D72
H77
H73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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