Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212417 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers No. 9/2018
Verlag: 
Bank of Finland, Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
Optimal monetary policy under discretion, commitment, and optimal simple rules regimes is analyzed through a behavioral New Keynesian model. Flexible price level targeting dominates under discretion; flexible inflation targeting dominates under commitment; and strict price level targeting dominates when using optimal simple rules. The optimality of a particular regime is found to be independent of bounded rationality and only regime 's stabilizing properties condition its hierarchy. For every targeting regime, the policymaker 's knowledge of agents' myopia is decisive in terms of policy reactions. Welfare evaluation of different targeting regimes reveals that bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with decreased welfare. Several forms of economic inattention can increase welfare.
JEL: 
C53
E37
E52
D01
D11
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-952-323-222-8
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
586.78 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.