Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/210088
Authors: 
Agarwal, Sumit
Karapetyan, Artashes
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 21/2015
Publisher: 
Norges Bank, Oslo
Abstract: 
We show how a regulatory disclosure of hidden debt can eliminate a large mispricing in housing. In a setting where homebuyers must combine several sources of debt, they are biased towards hidden loans, especially if they are young, or have no experience in financial investments or home acquisition. By reducing the mispricing of units with hidden debt, the increased salience of debt benefited homebuyers, particularly those that suffered most from it. An average homebuyer could save {dollar}18,000 by acquiring a dwelling with a one standard deviation lower debt. We confirm that lack of salience was the source of the bias, by showing that the regulation nearly eliminated the mispricing.
Subjects: 
salience
housing
cooperatives
mortgage
household finance
mispricing
JEL: 
D12
G14
G21
G32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-82-7553-888-6
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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