Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208552 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper No. 6-2008
Publisher: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the effects of mixed public-private R&D incentives and empirically tests whether patents that were publicly sponsored are more important than non-subsidized ones. Blending patents and public subsidies will allow the funding agency to subsidize inventions that would otherwise not elicit investment because the private incentive will not fully cover the cost of the invention. Thus, the policy maker will only subsidize inventions that have a high social value. The empirical analysis shows that subsidized inventions result in more important patents, as measured by the number of forward citations.
JEL: 
G10
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Working Paper

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