Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208542
Authors: 
Tvede, Mich
Olai Hansen, Bodil
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper 10-2007
Abstract: 
In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings just before the transfer window closes in european soccer. competition between sports clubs, dimension of quality of players, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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