Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207627 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 651
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Experiments can be used to relax technical assumptions that are made by necessity in theoretical analysis, and further test the robustness of theoretical predictions. To illustrate this point we conduct a three-person bargaining experiment examining the effect of different decision rules (unanimity and majority rule). Our experiment implements the substantive assumptions of the Baron-Ferejohn model but imposes no structure on the timing of proposals and votes. We compare our results to those obtained from an earlier experiment which implemented the specific procedural assumptions of the model. Our results are in many ways very similar to those from the more structured experiment: we find that most games end with the formation of a minimum winning coalition, and unanimity rule is associated with greater delay. However, the earlier finding of "proposer power" is reversed. While some important patterns are robust to the less stringent implementation of procedural assumptions, our less structured experiment provides new insights into how multilateral bargaining may play out in real world environments with no strict procedural rules on timing of offers and agreements.
Schlagwörter: 
Bargaining
group choice
voting rules
coalition formation
experimental methodology
JEL: 
C7
C9
D7
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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