Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207075
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2019-09
Publisher: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Abstract: 
We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a public good game and a trust game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior. Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality contribute more to the public good and are more likely to pick the trustworthy action in the trust game than other subjects. Since the experiments were spread out more than one year, our results suggest that there is a component of distributional preferences that is stable across games and over time.
Subjects: 
Distributional preferences
social preferences
Equality-Equivalence Test
representative online experiment
trust game
public goods game
dictator game
JEL: 
C72
C91
D64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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