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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SITE Working Paper No. 7
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper introduces the payoff-confirming analogy-based expectation equilibrium (PCABEE) as a way to refine the set of analogy-based equilibria and the associated admissible analogy partitions. In addition to the actions of others, own payoff history provides information about others' strategies but, yet, non-Bayesian Nash equilibria may exist both with an incorrect and a correct prior. We provide general conditions when this happens. Two stylized employer-employee interactions, one with a correct and one with an incorrect prior, are provided illustrating how PCABEE can be used to analyze robust stereotypes and how incorrect such stereotypes may lead to discrimination.
Schlagwörter: 
analogy expectations
bounded rationality
curse
learning
discrimination
stereotypes
JEL: 
C72
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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