Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204391 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IFRO Working Paper No. 2015/11
Publisher: 
University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO), Copenhagen
Abstract: 
In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where there default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default.
Subjects: 
Cooperation
Nudging
JEL: 
C90
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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