Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20420
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1180
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We perform a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of transfer fee regulations on professional soccer in Europe. Based on a model on the interaction of moral hazard and heterogeneity, we show (i) how the regulations effect contract durations and wages, (ii) that contracting parties have an incentive to agree upon inefficiently long contracts, (iii) how these incentives vary with the legal system, and (iv) how the relationship between contract duration and performance also depends on the legal system. With one exception, all theoretical results are empirically confirmed using a comprehensive data set from the top German Soccer League ("Bundesliga").
Subjects: 
Labor contracts
Bosman judgement
empirical contract theory
JEL: 
J41
L83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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