Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202678
Authors: 
Kitsos, Anastasios
Proestakis, Antonios
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Birmingham Business School Discussion Paper Series 2018-02
Abstract: 
This paper examines the role of political alignment and the electoral business cycle on municipality revenues in Greece for the period 2003-2010. A panel dataset combining local and national elections with local budgets is used to run a fixed-effects econometric model. The findings suggest that municipalities which are politically aligned to the national government receive more funds in the runup to elections. This is evidence of electoral considerations in the allocation of resources and calls for policy changes promoting greater fiscal decentralisation to reduce pork-barrelling and rent-seeking, as well as the dependency between the local and national government levels.
Subjects: 
distributive politics
government grants
pork-barrel
clientelism
fiscal decentralisation
partisanship
JEL: 
H50
H72
H77
R12
R58
URL of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.