Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202664 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Birmingham Business School Discussion Paper Series No. 2015-03
Verlag: 
University of Birmingham, Birmingham Business School, Birmingham
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the consequences of a monopolistic, non-partisan, profit-maximizing media on policy divergence. The media undertakes costly coverage that may reveal the quality of an office-seeking political challenger only if quality-conscious voters pay an access fee. Voters are ideologically homogenous and the incumbent politican is a populist with known quality. We show that while media absence implies a populist challenger, media presence yields platform extremism: it creates demand for information about quality and provides incentives to the media to invest in coverage that are exploited by high-quality challengers to signal strength.
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
URL der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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