Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202417 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
EAG Discussion Paper No. EAG 18-1
Publisher: 
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG), Washington, DC
Abstract: 
We model a two-level supply chain where Nash bargaining occurs upstream, while firms compete in a differentiated products logit setting downstream. The parameters of this model can be calibrated with a discrete set of data on prices, margins, and market shares. Using a series of numerical experiments, we illustrate how the model can simulate the outcome of both horizontal and vertical mergers. In addition, we extend the framework to allow for downstream competition via a second score auction.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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