Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202404
Authors: 
Miller, Nathan H.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
EAG Discussion Paper 13-1
Abstract: 
I extend the oligopoly model of Allaz and Vila (1993) to explore how forward contracting affects the adverse welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. I derive a welfare statistic that, within the context of the model, is free of structural parameters. The statistic allows for conclusions that generalize across different cost and demand conditions. I then show that exogenous forward contracting mitigates welfare loss but that endogenous forward contracting exacerbates welfare loss provided the relevant industry is sufficiently concentrated.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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