Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201688
Authors: 
Langus, Gregor
Lipatov, Vilen
Neven, Damien J.
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper 05-2018
Abstract: 
We model merger control procedures as a process of sequential acquisition of information in which mergers can be cleared after a first phase of investigation. We find that the enforceability of clearance decisions at the end of the first phase is unattractive to the extent that it prevents the authorities to use their expectations as to whether evidence gathered in the first phase will be confirmed in the second phase. This deprives the first phase of its potential as an effective screening mechanism. We also find that when clearance decisions in the first phase are enforceable, a different (higher) standard in the first phase is only desirable when Phase I decisions are captured by merging parties (as opposed to complainants).
Subjects: 
merger procedure
competition policy
JEL: 
K21
K40
L40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.