Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201645
Authors: 
Aslan, Fatma
Duman, Papatya
Trockel, Walter
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 620
Abstract: 
We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of efficient payoff vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of "coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.
Subjects: 
TU-games
duality
core
c-Core
cohesive games
complete game efficiency
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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