Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201636 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 611
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
Beauchêne, Li, and Li (2019) show that ambiguous persuasion leads to new interim equilibria with higher ex ante value for the Sender compared to the standard Bayesian persuasion. However, in their equilibrium the strategy of the Receiver is in general not ex ante optimal. This note, defines rectangular beliefs over the full state space in the same setting as Beauchêne et al. (2019) and shows that given rectangular beliefs the Receiver behaves dynamically consistent. Hence, the interim equilibrium of Beauchêne et al. (2019) is an ante equilibrium, as well.
Subjects: 
Bayesian Persuasion
Ambiguity Aversion
Dynamic Consistency
JEL: 
C73
D81
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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