Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201625 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 600
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
This paper studies the implications of a segmented labor market with efficient wage-employment bargaining on the internal labor market and a competitive external labor market on the temporary equilibrium of a closed monetary macroeconomy of the AS-AD type with government activity, fiat money, and expectations. Workers have identical preferences, those on the internal labor market are represented by a labor union. There is no mobility between the labor markets. Union power measured by the share of the production surplus allotted to the union and union density measured by the fraction of workers who are union members impact the functional income distribution, but neither affect the individual employment levels nor the aggregate employment level and the aggregate supply function. The wage on the internal labor market is above the wage on the external labor market if and only if the profit share of total revenue is smaller than under a fully competitive labor market. Unique temporary equilibria exist for all combinations of union power and union density. The paper provides a complete comparative-statics analysis showing in particular a negative price effect of union power and a positive price effect of union density. In general, the effects of union power and union density on any equilibrium value are usually of opposite signs. Single-labor-market models with a fully competitive or a fully unionized labor market are special or limiting cases of the segmented-labor-market model.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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