Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201624 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 599
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
This paper generalizes the concept of Sequential Equilibrium to allow for ambiguous incomplete information about types or states. We characterize conditions that ensure existence of Sequential Equilibria under ambiguous incomplete information. Under these conditions players form subjective prior belief sets that satisfy a rectangularity condition which leads to dynamically consistent behavior. Furthermore, we give an example which shows that ambiguity can introduce new Sequential Equilibria.
Subjects: 
sequential equilibrium
ambiguity
dynamic consistency
multiple priors
imprecise information
JEL: 
C73
D81
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.