Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201608
Authors: 
Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain H.
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 584
Abstract: 
I analyze the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. The same method can be used to fully characterize the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any the finitely repeated game.
Subjects: 
Finitely Repeated Games
Pure Strategy
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Limit Perfect Folk Theorem
Discount Factor
JEL: 
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.