Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200800 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] KDI Journal of Economic Policy [ISSN:] 2586-4130 [Volume:] 38 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Korea Development Institute (KDI) [Place:] Sejong [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 95-114
Publisher: 
Korea Development Institute (KDI), Sejong
Abstract: 
We study how an advantage given to an interim winner in sequential conflicts characterizes dynamic competition between players and influences their payoffs. As the intensity of competition during each period is negatively correlated, perfect security is not necessarily desirable for contending parties. We present results which are widely applicable to various types of dynamic competition, where competition in each period is linked to the interim winner's relative advantage. Policy implications are also discussed in a variety of areas, and several extensions are explored.
Subjects: 
Sequential Conflicts
AllPay Auctions
Sequential Innovations
Arms Race
JEL: 
D44
D74
O31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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