Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19811
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dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:07:19Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:07:19Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19811-
dc.description.abstractThe number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economieswith poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and showthat the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects.First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses therent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage.We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield astable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. Thereis also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number ofbad firms liquidated.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics |x18en_US
dc.subject.jelG33en_US
dc.subject.jelK10en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCredit marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbank competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen_US
dc.subject.keywordbankruptcyen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelationship bankingen_US
dc.titleQuality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcyen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500758492en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec05:3491-

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