Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19811 
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dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:07:19Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:07:19Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19811-
dc.description.abstractThe number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer |cHannoveren
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 |x18en
dc.subject.jelG33en
dc.subject.jelK10en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCredit marketsen
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen
dc.subject.keywordbank competitionen
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen
dc.subject.keywordbankruptcyen
dc.subject.keywordrelationship bankingen
dc.titleQuality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500758492en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec05:3491en

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