Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19811 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 No. 18
Verlag: 
Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer, Hannover
Zusammenfassung: 
The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.
Schlagwörter: 
Credit markets
institutions
bank competition
information sharing
bankruptcy
relationship banking
JEL: 
G33
K10
G21
D82
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
866.89 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.