Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197530 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ILE Working Paper Series No. 25
Verlag: 
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Constitutional democracy is in decline and many would-be autocrats try to elude constitutional constraints or even to exploit constitutions in their favor. We make a number of proposals for designing constitutions that are more resilient against such attempts. A first look at the empirical evidence, however, is sobering. There is little evidence that many appealing constitutional rules are able to increase constitutional resilience.
Schlagwörter: 
constitutional compliance
militant democracy
militant constitutionalism
de jure de facto gap
democratic backsliding
JEL: 
H11
K38
P51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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