Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/196613 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CIW Discussion Paper No. 1/2019
Verlag: 
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung (CIW), Münster
Zusammenfassung: 
Why do groups of even well-educated individuals sometimes persistently believe in political myths and ideologies? We follow cognition psychology in its finding that individuals sometimes stick with intuitive but false propositions. We also follow Kahneman, however, in maintaining that they challenge their intuition when the consequences for their individual wealth are sufficiently high. We embed these propositions into a model that determines the conditions of a myth equilibrium, in which almost all individuals stick with ex-post rationalization to justify their initial intuition, or a truth equilibrium in which all individuals pursue ex-ante reasoning that aims to get as close to the truth as possible. We show why myths are clustered around certain groups and why groups are more likely to stick with political myths than individuals, thus disproving Condorcet's jury theorem.
Schlagwörter: 
Cognition
Ideology
Rational Ignorance
JEL: 
D72
D83
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
611.46 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.