Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/195866 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Risks [ISSN:] 2227-9091 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-12
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This paper provides a rationale for the macro-prudential regulation of insurance companies, where capital requirements increase in their contribution to systemic risk. In the absence of systemic risk, the formal model in this paper predicts that optimal regulation may be implemented by capital regulation (similar to that observed in practice, e.g., Solvency II ) and by actuarially fair technical reserve. However, these instruments are not sufficient when insurance companies are exposed to systemic risk: prudential regulation should also add a systemic component to capital requirements that is non-decreasing in the firm's exposure to systemic risk. Implementing the optimal policy implies separating insurance firms into two categories according to their exposure to systemic risk: those with relatively low exposure should be eligible for bailouts, while those with high exposure should not benefit from public support if a systemic event occurs.
Subjects: 
insurance companies
systemic risk
optimal regulation
JEL: 
G22
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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