Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195567
Authors: 
Ambrus, Attila
Chaney, Eric
Salitskiy, Igor
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 9 [Year:] 2018 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 217-246
Abstract: 
We investigate the effect of delay on prices in bargaining situations using a data set containing thousands of captives ransomed from Barbary pirates between 1575 and 1692. Plausibly exogenous variation in the delay in ransoming provides ev- idence that negotiating delays decreased the size of ransom payments, and that much of the effect stems from the signalling value of strategic delay, in accordance with theoretical predictions. We also structurally estimate a version of the screen- ing type bargaining model, adjusted to our context, and find that the model fits both the observed prices and acceptance probabilities well.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
piracy
ransom
JEL: 
D23
K42
N45
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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