Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/195471 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Econometrics [ISSN:] 2225-1146 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-24
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This paper provides a new statistical model for repeated voluntary contribution mechanism games. In a repeated public goods experiment, contributions in the first round are cross-sectionally independent simply because subjects are randomly selected. Meanwhile, contributions to a public account over rounds are serially and cross-sectionally correlated. Furthermore, the cross-sectional average of the contributions across subjects usually decreases over rounds. By considering this non-stationary initial condition-the initial contribution has a different distribution from the rest of the contributions-we model statistically the time varying patterns of the average contribution in repeated public goods experiments and then propose a simple but efficient method to test for treatment effects. The suggested method has good finite sample performance and works well in practice.
Subjects: 
repeated public goods games
asymptotic treatment effects
trend regression
JEL: 
C91
C92
C33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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