Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/194816 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CEPIE Working Paper No. 02/19
Verlag: 
Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE), Dresden
Zusammenfassung: 
The loss of international competitiveness of domestic industries remains a key obstacle to the implementation of effective carbon prices in a world without harmonized climate policies. We analyze countries' non-cooperative choices of emissions taxes under imperfect competition and mobile polluting firms. In our general equilibrium setup with trade, wage effects prevent all firms from locating in the same country. While under local or no pollution countries achieve the first-best, under transboundary pollution taxes are inefficiently low and lower than under autarky where only the "standard" free-riding incentive distorts emissions taxes. This effect is more pronounced when polluting firms are mobile.
Schlagwörter: 
Strategic Environmental Policy
Firm Location
Carbon Leakage
General Equilibrium
JEL: 
F12
F18
H23
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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