Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191480
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IRENE Working Paper No. 15-09
Publisher: 
University of Neuchâtel, Institute of Economic Research (IRENE), Neuchâtel
Abstract: 
Using a unique dataset, based on the 49th Swiss legislature, we assess lobbying effect on politicians' votes. Counselors' ties are approximated by their mandates in in legal entities. Political representatives' fidelity to their political group is measured by a dummy proximity indicator. We find that proximity increases over time, as the legislature approaches to the end. Furthermore, using alternative techniques, we find that lobbying matters. More precisely, focusing on the econometric results, once controlled for individual features and political groups affiliation, we find that having mandates in energy, banking and insurance, and in the transport sectors reduces counselors' proximity. Finally, we also find that being male, young and being elected in a French or Italian speaking canton negatively affects the proximity measure.
Subjects: 
Groups of pressure
lobbies
special interests
Swiss Parliament
voting behaviour
JEL: 
D7
H7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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