Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191066
Authors: 
Vasilev, Aleksandar
Year of Publication: 
2019
Abstract: 
In this paper we investigate the quantitative importance of collective agreements in explaining uctuations in Bulgarian labor markets. Following Maffezzoli (2001), we introduce a monopoly union in a real-business-cycle model with government sector. We calibrate the model to Bulgarian data for the period following the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999-2016), and compare and contrast it to a model with indivisible labor and no unions as in Rogerson and Wright (1988). We find that the sequential bargaining between unions and firms produces an important internal propagation mechanism, which fits data much better that the alternative framework with indivisible labor.
Subjects: 
business cycles
general equilibrium
labor unions
indivisible labor
involuntary unemployment
JEL: 
E32
E24
J23
J51
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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